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Abstract
Lone wolf terrorists pose a large threat to modern society. The current ability to identify and stop these kinds of
terrorists before they commit a terror act is limited since they are hard to detect using traditional methods. However,
these individuals often make use of Internet to spread their beliefs and opinions, and to obtain information and
knowledge to plan an attack. Therefore there is a good possibility that they leave digital traces in the form of weak
signals that can be gathered, fused, and analyzed.
In this article we present an analysis method that can be used to analyze extremist forums to detect digital traces of
possible lone wolf terrorists. This method is conceptually demonstrated using the FOI Impactorium fusion platform.
We also present a number of different technologies which can be used to harvest and analyze pieces of information
from Internet that may serve as weak digital traces that can be fused using the suggested analysis method in order to
discover possible lone wolf terrorists.
Introduction
Today, one of the most challenging and unpredictable
forms of terrorism is violent terror acts committed by sin-
gle individuals, often referred to as lone wolf terrorists
or lone actor terrorists. These kinds of terror attacks are
hard to detect and defend against by traditional police
means such as infiltration or wiretapping, since the lone
wolves are planning and carrying out the attacks on their
own. The problem of lone wolf terrorism is according
to many officials presently on the rise and viewed as
a greater threat towards society than organized groups.
Even though available statistics suggest that lone wolf ter-
rorists account for a rather small proportion of all terror
incidents [1], they can often have a large impact on society
[2]. Moreover, many of the major terrorist attacks in the
United States (with exception for the 2001 attacks against
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the White House)
were executed by single individuals who were sympa-
thetic to a larger cause—from the Oklahoma City bomber
Timothy McVeigh to the Washington area sniper John
Allen Muhammad. A similar development can be seen in
Europe, where several terrorist attacks have been executed
by lone wolf terrorists during the last years. One of the
most terrifying acts was the two 2011 terror attacks in
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Norway committed by Anders Behring Breivik, killing 77
persons in total.
Even though lone wolf terrorists cannot in general be
captured by traditional intelligence techniques, this does
not imply that there is nothing counterterrorist organiza-
tions can do to prevent them. In fact, despite the popular
use of the term “lone wolf terrorist,” many of the perpetra-
tors are only loners in their offline life, but are often very
active in communicating their views and radical opin-
ions in various discussion groups or other kinds of social
media. According to Sageman [3], most lone wolves are
part of online forums, especially those who go on to actu-
ally carry out terrorist attacks. This makes the Internet an
incredibly important source for finding potential lone wolf
terrorists.
There are several communities that encourage and
influence individuals to act alone (one example being the
English language online magazine Inspire, published by
the militant Islamist organization al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula). Moreover, individuals that act alone are also
often active on and influencing these kinds of communi-
ties. Online extremist forums and web sites allow for aber-
rant beliefs or attitudes to be exchanged and reinforced,
and create environments in which otherwise unacceptable
views become normalized [4]. In addition to give a pos-
sibility of becoming part of a community, the Internet is
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also a platform where lone wolves can express their views.
The 2010 suicide bomber in Stockholm, Taimour Abdul-
wahab al-Abdaly, was for example active on Internet and
had a YouTube account, a Facebook account, and searched
for a second wife on Islamic web pages. Anders Behring
Breivik used several different social networking sites
such as Facebook and Twitter, and posted his manifesto
“2083—A European Declaration of Independence” on the
Internet before committing the two terror attacks in
Norway. The possession of several social media accounts
is obviously perfectly normal, but the actual social media
content can indicate that someone is planning a terror
attack.
One of the major problems with analyzing information
from the Internet is that it is huge, making it impossi-
ble for analysts to manually search for information and
analyze all data concerning radicalization processes and
terror plans of possible lone wolf terrorists. In addition
to all material that the analysts can find through the
use of various search engines, there are also enormous
amounts of information in the so called hidden or Deep
Web, i.e., the part of Internet that is not indexed by the
search engines’ web spiders (e.g., due to password pro-
tection or dynamically generated content). To produce
fully automatic computer tools for finding terror plans is
not possible, both due to the large amounts of data and
the deep knowledge that is needed to really understand
what is discussed or expressed in written text (or other
kinds of data available on the Internet, such as videos
or images). However, computer-based support tools that
aid the analysts in their investigation could enable them
to process more data and give better possibilities to ana-
lyze and detect the digital traces [5]. In this article, we
suggest the use of techniques such as hyperlink analy-
sis and natural language processing to map the existing
dark web forums and to find out which forums and users
that can be of interest for human analysts to take a closer
look at. In order to combine the outputs from the various
suggested methods, we propose using information fusion
techniques implemented in FOI’s Impactorium fusion
platform [6-8].
It is important to understand what can and cannot be
done by the type of tools that we present in this article.
Our aim is not to produce tools for completely auto-
matic analysis of web information. Rather, the goal is
to do research on support tools and methods that help
law enforcement officers in ongoing investigations of web
extremism. The research presented in this article is part
of the fusion framework that we are building, and should
be seen as suggestions for how components of a full sys-
tem could be implemented. Some of the components have
already been implemented and evaluated (e.g., the sug-
gested alias matching algorithms, see [9]), while other
components are not yet implemented and evaluated (e.g.,
algorithms for discovering warning behaviors such as fix-
ation in postings). A full system for investigation of web
extremism must be scalable and also account for privacy
and integrity issues as well as what is legally possible
and not. An important output of this kind of research is
to make legislators aware of the possibilities and limita-
tions of web analysis, in particular concerning opportu-
nities for abuse that might arise if they are implemented
operationally.
What is an extreme opinion will of course depend on
the viewpoint of the user. This is yet another reason for
being careful before implementing systems such as the
one described in this article. There must be clear legal
guidelines that respect the privacy and integrity of citi-
zens before law enforcement officers can be allowed to do
semi-automatic analysis of web content. Controls must be
built into the systems, to limit as much as possible the
possibilities of abuse.
The rest of this article is outlined as follows. In the
section “Lone wolf terrorists,” we give a short background
to lone wolf terrorism, and the challenge of finding and
identifying such individuals before it is too late. In the
section “Analysis model” we propose an analysis method
for breaking down the problem of analyzing whether a
person is a lone wolf terrorist or not into smaller sub-
problems, such as identifying motives (intent), capabili-
ties, and opportunities. These are broken down further,
until more concrete indicators are identified that can be
fused in order to make an estimate of how probable it
is that an individual is a lone wolf terrorist. This is fol-
lowed by a short section entitled “Users” containing a
description of the potential users of the system and the
requirements on their training. The section “Seed identi-
fication and topic-filtered web harvesting” describes how
topic-filtered web harvesting can be used to collect rele-
vant information, and the section “Techniques for analyz-
ing data” presents techniques that can be used to detect
indicators supporting that someone has intent to com-
mit a terror attack. The section “Ranking and assessment
of aliases” describes how the gathered indicators can be
assessed, and the section “Alias matching” describes how
Internet users with multiple aliases can be detected. The
section entitled “The FOI Impactorium fusion platform”
describes how the Impactorium tool can be used to fuse
weak signals for detecting lone wolf terrorists. A discus-
sion about the future potential of this kind of techniques
and privacy aspects related to automatic monitoring and
analysis tools is provided in the section “Discussion.”
Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in the
section “Conclusions.”
Lone wolf terrorists
The definition of a lone wolf terrorist to be used through-
out this article is the one used in [10]:
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A lone wolf terrorist is a person who acts on his or her
own without orders from or connections to an
organization.
Lone wolves come from a variety of backgrounds and
can have a wide range of motives for their actions. It
is observed by [1] that lone wolf terrorists are often
creating their own ideologies, combining aversion with
religion, society, or politics with a personal frustration.
Hence, a lone wolf terrorist can in theory come in any size,
any shape, and any ethnicity, as well as representing any
ideology [11].
To conduct a successful terror attack, it is necessary to
have a number of skills and/or capabilities. For a lone wolf,
obtaining the necessary capabilities for an attack might be
a problem since they can not in general receive the same
kind of systematic training such as, e.g., al-Qaeda terror-
ists. This may be one of the reasons why lone wolves are
rarely suicide bombers, i.e., since such an attack may be
too complicated and involves too much preparation [11].
However, the Internet contains much material that poten-
tial lone wolf terrorists can use to acquire the knowledge
they need to succeed with more simple kinds of attacks.
For example, resources such as “the Anarchist Cookbook,”
“Training with a handgun,” “Remote Control Detonation,”
and “How to make a bomb in the kitchen of your mom”
are known to be widespread on the Internet and have been
used by lone wolf terrorists for acquiring knowledge on
how to build simple pipe bombs, etc.
It is not unusual that lone wolf terrorists are sympa-
thizing with extremist movements, but by definition they
are not part of or actively supported by these movements.
This makes it very hard to discover and capture lone wolf
terrorists before they strike, as traditional methods such
as wiretapping and infiltration of the organization are not
applicable (since there are no networks or organizations
to infiltrate). Moreover, it can be very hard to differenti-
ate between those individuals who are really intending to
commit an actual terrorism act, and those who have rad-
ical beliefs but stay within the law. In fact, there are very
many people that have extremism opinions, but only a
minority of those cross the line into taking violent action
based on such beliefs.
Digital traces on the Internet
Even though lone wolf terrorists are in general extremely
hard to detect by traditional means, there are often many
weak signals available that, if detected and fused, can be
used as markers of potentially interesting behavior that
have to be analyzed deeper and investigated further. As
has been mentioned by Fredholm [12], nearly all radical-
ization of lone wolf terrorists take place on the Internet.
One example of a well-known online resource inspir-
ing homegrown terrorism is the online magazine Inspire,
published by the Yemen-based organization al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Internet based recruit-
ment to terrorist groups is also likely to grow in signif-
icance, although recruitment to terror organizations are
more often dependent also on offline networks [3,4,13].
These kinds of Internet based radicalization processes
often result in various digital traces, created when visiting
extremist forums, making postings with offensive content,
etc. There are also many other examples where Internet
has been used by lone wolves to spread their views and
opinions before committing an actual attack. One such
example is the anti-abortion activist Scott Roeder who
killed the physician George Tiller in Kansas in 2009 [14].
Tiller was one of the few doctors in the United States
that performed late abortions, and before the attack Scott
Roeder wrote a column on an abortion critical web page
where he expressed his views against abortion and Tiller’s
work. Another example of a lone wolf that was using Inter-
net to express his views is James von Brunn, also known
as the Holocaust Museum shooter [15]. Von Brunn was
an anti-Semitic white supremacist who was in charge of
an anti-Semitic website where he was able to express his
views long before the attack.
Once a terror activity has taken place, it is not unusual
that, e.g., media collect various digital traces in retrospect,
and make complaints about the police’s or intelligence
service’s ineffectiveness or lack of competence. However,
although it can be quite easy to find the related evidence
once the terror activity already has taken place, it is much
more difficult to find out what the relevant clues (weak
signals) are before an actual attack has been carried out.
There are some signs that can be identified, though. One
such sign is activity on radical forums or other forms of
social media. Another sign is radical or hateful expressions
in written text.
In [16], a number of suggestions of behavioral mark-
ers for radical violence that can be identified in written
text are presented. These behavioral markers are derived
from a list of warning behaviors described in [17]. The
behavioral markers considered in [16] are:
Leakage , i.e., the communication to a third party of an
intent to do harm to a target, such as the postings made
by many school shooters before their attacks.
Fixation , i.e., an increasingly pathological preoccupation
with a person or a cause, such as Clayton Waagner’s
gathering of target information on abortion doctors.
Identification , i.e., the desire to be like an influential
role-model, “warrior identification,” or identification with
a group or larger cause. One example of warrior identi-
fication would be the images of Anders Behring Breivik
pointing an automatic weapon against the camera.
These behavioral markers can be used as indicators sup-
porting that someone intends to commit a terror attack.
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To find relevant digital traces for the behavioral markers,
semi-automated analysis is needed since it is impossible
for human analysts to manually monitor all the activities
of interest on Internet. Such analysis is described in more
detail in the section “Techniques for analyzing data.” In the
next section, an analysis model that can be used to ana-
lyze digital traces that a possible lone wolf terrorist might
leave on the Internet is presented.
While there is much research on markers for extrem-
ist behavior, it is important to realize that the possibility
for human biases when defining them always exists. The
users who operate the analysis tools must be aware of this
and measures must be taken to ensure that, as much as
possible, the chosen markers are objective. One way of
ensuring this is through extensive training for the analysts.
In addition, it must be possible to continuously update
and adapt the chosenmarkers if, for instance, a person has
been wrongly identified as an extremist and the reason
for the mistake can be identified as a single marker. This
highlights the need for always explicitly storing the chain
of evidence or markers that have been used for reaching a
certain conclusion.
Analysis model
A classical approach to address complex problems is to
break them down into more manageable sub-problems,
solve these separately and then aggregate the results into
a solution for the overarching problem. This approach is
well suited for the analysis of weak signals. For each poten-
tial threat actor, which in most cases will be represented
by one or many aliases (user names), a model is cre-
ated through the successive decomposition of the threat
hypothesis into a number of indicators, corresponding
to the weak signals that we want to capture. Figure 1
shows a (simplified) model of how the decomposition
of the hypothesis “Actor X is a potential lone wolf ter-
rorist” could look like. At the first level, the hypothesis
is separated in three general threat assessment criteria:
Intent (or motive), Capability, and Opportunity. If all
these are met there is a potential risk for an attack. The
next level of decomposition shows a number of indica-
tors that can possibly be detected through reconnaissance
on the Internet, and the indicator “Materiel procurement”
which could also be detected through other information
channels.
Once an initial decomposition is done, parallel sub-
processes can be started for the various sub-hypotheses.
As an example, assuming that an analyst believes that
someone needs to have both intent and capability in order
to commit a terror attack, one sub-process can focus on
looking for possible intent (e.g., based on radical postings
made by the individual) while the other one is focus-
ing on capability (e.g., web sites discussing how to make
bombs). The results from the various sub-processes are
then fused and can be used to assess whether someone
has an increased likelihood of committing an act of ter-
ror, resulting in a list of potentially dangerous actors that
might be subject to further analysis. It is important to note
that since we consider digital traces that are left on the
Internet, it is only possible to detect aliases that might
have an increased risk of committing an act of terror, but
how the physical person behind the alias can be detected
is another problem that is outside the scope of this article.
In this work we focus our attention on the problem of
finding out whether someone has the intent to commit
an act of terror. In the section “Techniques for analyzing
data” we describe techniques that can be utilized in order
to detect digital traces that can be used as evidence for
some of the identified indicators supporting that someone
has the intent of committing a terror attack.
Users
As mentioned previously, this article describes concepts
and prototypes that could be implemented in an opera-
tional system for web analysis of extremist behavior. The
















Figure 1 Breakdown of a hypothesis regarding a possible lone wolf terrorist.
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who today investigates web extremism by browsing well-
known extremist web sites andmanually searches for signs
of planned terror attacks or individuals that have to be
investigated more closely. By developing a better support
system for this, it will be possible to analyze more data and
reduce the risk for false negatives. It is important that the
potential introduction of such systems is accompanied by
clear regulations regarding what data the user is, and is
not, allowed to investigate. Prototype systems such as the
one developed by the project described herein could be an
important help for legislators and human rights organiza-
tions to evaluate the consequences of allowing or banning
different kinds of automatic analyses.
It is important that the users of web analysis systems
are properly trained. In addition to the training in legal,
privacy and integrity issues that was touched upon above,
they must also have proper training in decision theory
to be able to avoid as many as possible of the human
biases that might otherwise induce them to construct
non-objective analysis models and markers. Total impar-
tiality when constructing these if of course a chimera.
Hence it is necessary to include checks and balances in
the system, both in the technology and in the form of peer
reviews of both analysis models (including markers) and
the results of analyses.
We believe that serious gaming [18,19] training could be
an important component to help ensure that the users of
the system meet these requirements. By making the train-
ing as realistic as possible, it will be easier to train the
analyst to detect their own biases. This is, however, just an
idea that has not yet been tested and will not be elaborated
upon further in the article.
Seed identification and topic-filtered web
harvesting
The amount of content on the Internet is enormous and
it does not make sense to try to search for digital traces
from potential lone wolf terrorists without any guid-
ance. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the search and
instead focus on a smaller subset of the Internet. Although
there are large portions of the web that are not reach-
able using search engines such as Google, many extremist
web sites are well-known, since part of the idea is to
communicate ideologies and other messages to the larger
masses. Moreover, a majority of extremist web sites con-
tain links to other extremist sites, according to a study
presented in [20]. Hence, it makes sense to use well-
known extremist sites as seeds1, and then try to identify
other interesting forums and sites that in some way are
connected to the web sites, by using the seeds as a start-
ing point (it is not necessarily so that only extremist web
sites are of interest, also “normal” web sites containing
information regarding an indicator may be interesting to
watch).
The process of systematically collecting web pages is
often referred to as crawling. Usually, the crawling pro-
cess starts from one or more given source web page(s) (the
seeds described above) and follows the source page hyper-
links to find more web pages [21]. The crawling process is
repeated on each new page and continues until no more
new pages are discovered or until a certain number of
pages (that have been determined beforehand) have been
collected. By treating the collected web sites as nodes in
a graph, and by creating an edge between two web sites
each time a hyperlink is found between them, it becomes
possible to create a (large) network that can be analyzed
further to find out which the most interesting web sites
are. By using hyperlink analysis a large number of poten-
tial extremist forums can be found. However, many of the
web sites will be perfectly normal, making them rather
uninteresting for intelligence analysts. Hence, it is of utter-
most interest to be able to automatically separate web
sites with interesting content from the ones with nor-
mal, uninteresting content (that is, from a counterterrorist
perspective). In order to make this kind of analysis, natu-
ral language processing (NLP) and text mining can be of
great use. As a first step, we suggest having a predefined
list of keywords to search for on the crawled web pages.
If enough of the terms are encountered on a web page,
it is marked as interesting and the web site is added to
the queue. However, if they are marked as irrelevant, the
web page becomes discarded, and no links are followed
from it. The same holds true for URLs that are part of
a white list, to which the analyst can choose to add web
sites matching the keywords but are judged not to be rel-
evant for further analysis (e.g., web sites with the purpose
of countering extremist propaganda). While crawling the
web it is also possible to discard links that are broken.
If a web site is inaccessible due to password protection,
the analyst can be asked to either choose to discard the
link, or to manually create a user login and enter the
user credentials to access material on the site. Our sug-
gested approach is in many ways similar to the approach
used for identifying online child pornography networks
in [22].
To evaluate our web mining approach, we have imple-
mented a proof-of-concept web spider. The goal is to
create a network consisting of web sites, forums (dis-
cussion boards), forum posts and aliases. An example
of such a network can be found in Figure 2. As can be
noted, the network becomes very large and therefore it is
important to prune the network using natural language
processing techniques. The spider is based on the crawler
Crawler4J2 and extended withmethods for Internet forum
information extraction.
Given a set of seeds (web page URLs), the web spider
expands the network by following all links that can be
found on the page that meet a set of conditions. First of
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Figure 2 A network graph created by our web spider based on a single seed. Nodes in the network represent a discussion board, posts, and
aliases.
all the link should point to a web page, and secondly the
content of the web page should be classified as interesting
(matching a list of one or several predefined keywords).
If the page represents a discussion forum, tailored con-
tent extraction algorithms are applied. The algorithms
extract the user aliases and their posts, and add this infor-
mation to the network (to be further used in the web
site and alias assessment phases). In our initial proof-of-
concept implementation, we have developed information
extraction algorithms for a specific representative Internet
forum.
In a real-world setting, one needs to address the fact that
Internet forums or web sites may have significantly differ-
ent structures. Hence, a flexible strategy for learning the
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structure of a new site is desirable. One way to overcome
this obstacle is to let an algorithm guess the structure,
try to extract relevant information and let a human (the
analyst) verify the results. Another way is to let humans
analyze the hypertext representation and locate specific
tags that can be used as markers for where to find relevant
information and how to separate posts.
Techniques for analyzing data
Once the collection of relevant data from the Internet is
done the content of the web site and forums needs to
be analyzed. In this section we present techniques that
can be used by intelligence analysts to analyze data with
the aim of discovering indicators supporting that some-
one has intent to commit an act of terror. The goal of
the process described in this section is to obtain a list
of potential lone wolf terrorists that need further inves-
tigation. Comparing our suggested approach to related
work already described in existing research literature (see,
e.g., [23-25]), two main differences can be identified: 1)
our focus on lone wolf terrorists rather than terror orga-
nizations, and 2) our focus on semi-automated tools for
supporting the analyst, rather than fully automated tools.
While it obviously is interesting to construct fully auto-
matic tools for web analysis, it is more realistic to consider
a web analysis system that consists of a human user that is
supported by tools such as those described in this article.
In addition to the problems of making reliable automated
tools, there are also cultural and ethical requirements
that make it interesting to consider semi-automated
tools [5].
From the topic-filtered web harvesting, a set of interest-
ing web sites or forums are collected. The idea is to make a
deeper analysis of these sites by making use of natural lan-
guage processing and text mining techniques. One type of
text mining known as affect analysis has earlier been iden-
tified as being useful for measuring the presence of hate
and violence in extremist forums [26]. To be able to use
natural language processing techniques, it is necessary to
first preprocess the retrieved content from the web sites.
This preprocessing step for example includes removing
HTML tags and tokenizing the text into sentences. From
the collected data, all aliases are extracted and a model is
created for each alias. The fact that all identified aliases
are active on web sites that are considered radical qualifies
them as candidates for further investigation.
Intent
We have in [16] identified a set of indicators for someone
having the intent to commit an act of terror and becoming
a lone wolf terrorist. The list of indicators is not com-
prehensive and we use it to illustrate how it is possible
to automatically detect evidence for indicators using text
analysis techniques. The indicators that we use are:
• the fact that someone is active on a radical web page,




In the following sections we describe techniques that
can be used to automatically detect these indicators from
text.
Active on radical web pages
The fact that someone is active on a radical web page can
be revealed by identifying any kind of activity on the set of
web pages that are collected using the topic-filtered web
harvesting. The web pages that are collected are all con-
sidered to be radical in some sense and therefore we can
assume that all users that are active on any of the web
pages may be considered radical. This assumption does
not necessarily hold true in practice since people may post
things on extremist web pages without being extremists
themselves. In such cases it is however unlikely that other
indicators will be activated for the person anyway.
Radical expression in postings
Classifiers for estimating the level of radical content or
other types of interestingness in a text (e.g., a blog post or
a tweet) can be built in various ways. One alternative is to
manually create a discriminant-word lexicon that can be
used for classifying the text; the higher fraction of terms in
the text present in the lexicon, the higher the level of inter-
estingness. To manually create such a list may be a tricky
task, and it may also be necessary to update the list with
regular intervals, as the popular words to express radical
opinions or other kinds of topics may change over time.
Within the research field of text mining, it has been shown
that handcrafted lexicons are often not the best alternative
for text classification tasks. Instead, various unsupervised
and supervised learning algorithms are more frequently
used. Irrespectively of which type of technique that is
used, some input will be needed from an expert. In case a
handcrafted list of words is used, the actual terms to use
have to be specified by experts. In the case of an unsuper-
vised approach, a list of seed terms has to be suggested
by the experts which then can be used to automatically
find and classify other terms that, e.g., are synonyms or
antonyms to the manually labeled terms, or in other ways
are co-occurring with terms with a known label. Finally,
in the supervised case, the expert has to manually clas-
sify a number of text samples into the classes radical
and non-radical (or interesting and non-interesting in the
more general case). It can be expected that the supervised
approach will yield the best performance, but this comes
with a cost of finding useful data for training purposes,
and the manual annotation of the training data. This kind
of methods have previously been proposed in [26].
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One type of classifier that is often used for various
supervised natural language classification tasks is the
naïve Bayes classifier. This is the classifier we currently
intend to use in our system. The classifier, however, still
needs to be learned using representative training samples,
which remains as future work. An advantage of such an
approach is that it is easy to interpret for humans, making
it possible to verify that a learned model looks reasonable.
Furthermore, it is more computationally effective than
many alternative algorithms, making the learning phase
faster. In order to use such a classifier for discriminating
between texts with radical and non-radical content, a nat-
ural first step would be to tokenize the text. By extracting
features such as unigrams (single words), bigrams (pairs of
words) or trigrams (triples of words) from the tokenized
text, this can be used for training the classifier and to clas-
sify new texts once the classifier has been trained. Since
there would be very many features if allowing for all pos-
sible unigrams and bigrams, a necessary step would be
feature reduction, in which the most informative features
f1, . . . , fn are selected from the training data and used as
leaf nodes in the resulting classifier. By extracting fea-
tures from new texts to be classified, we can according to
Bayes’ theorem calculate the posterior probability of the
text having a certain label (e.g., radical or non-radical) as:
P(label|f1, . . . , fn) = P(label)P(f1, . . . , fn|label)P(f1, . . . , fn) . (1)
Now, by using the conditional independence assumption
of the naïve Bayes model, this is reduced to:




This conditional independence assumption is rather
strong and does not necessarily hold in practice. Given
the class label, the occurrence of a word is not indepen-
dent of all other words, even though this is assumed in
Equation 2. This may result in that conditionally depen-
dent words can have too much influence on the clas-
sification. Despite this, naïve Bayes methods have been
shown to work well for many real-world problems. The
needed probabilities on the right side of Equation 2 can
easily be estimated from the training data (using Laplace
smoothing to account for zero counts).
Other popular choices for text classification tasks is the
use of maximum entropy classifiers (relying on the prin-
ciple of choosing the most uniform distribution satisfying
the constraints given by the training data) or support vec-
tor machines. Regardless of the choice of classifier, the
most important part is to get hold of enough training data
of good quality. Once this is solved, the next big question
is which features to use. To use unigrams as features is the
most straightforward way and will most likely be enough
to separate terrorism-related discussions frommany other
kinds of discussions of no relevance to the subject matter.
However, it is not obvious that unigrams are enough for
more fine-grained classification, e.g., separating between
postings where terrorist acts are discussed or reported
on, and where intentions to actually commit terrorism
acts are expressed. It may therefore be beneficial to use
bigrams or trigrams to allow for a less shallow analysis.
The feature set to be used in our implementation will be
decided in future experiments.
It should be noted that what ought to be taken to con-
stitute radical behavior is often in the eyes of the beholder.
However, since such judgements are made by analysts
already today (although manually), creation of algorithms
that classify posts according to the same criteria would
be no different from todays’ situation (except for that the
classification of texts then can be made on a much larger
scale).
Leakage
A notable characteristic of lone wolf terrorists is that they
often announce their views and intentions in advance. In
the samples of school shooters (a phenomenon closely
related to lone wolf terrorism) analyzed in [27], it can
be seen that a majority of the perpetrators revealed
their intentions in social media before carrying out their
attacks. Leakage is the communication to a third party of
an intent to do harm to a target. Leakage can be either
intentional or unintentional and more or less specific
regarding the actual attack [17].
Leaked information of intent is likely to contain auxil-
iary verbs signaling intent (i.e., “. . .will . . . ,” “. . . am going
to . . . ,” “. . . should . . . ”) together with words expressing vio-
lent action, either overtly or, perhaps more likely, through
euphemisms. Based on these observations, leakage can
potentially be detected by using a simple approach where
the analyzed text after stemming or lemmatization (reduc-
ing the end of a word in order to return the word’s
common base form) is matched against a predefined word
list of violent actions. Since there is a large number of
synonyms that can be used for the verbs signaling a vio-
lent intent, the use of an ontology such as the lexical
database WordNet3 in which semantic relations between
synonym sets are expressed can be used. An example of
such a semantic relation would be that the verb “mas-
sacre” belongs to the same synonym set as the words
“mow down” and “slaughter.” By using such semantic rela-
tions, the number of words that must be explicitly defined
in the word list of terms to search for can be decreased.
Since the occurrence of a single word expressing a vio-
lent action is far from enough for classifying a sentence as
being a linguistic marker for leakage, part-of-speech tag-
ging should also be taken into account when searching for
indications of leakage. This kind of text analysis methods
obviously has a hard time coping with ironic statements,
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leading to a risk of false positives where jokes are classified
as a potential marker or leakage. However, by restricting
the attention to sites or forums that through automated
content analysis or prior knowledge are known to contain
content related to violent extremism, false positives can
most likely be kept at an acceptable level.
Example To illustrate leakage we use a sentence from
Anders Behring Breivik’s manifesto “2083—A European
Declaration of Independence”:
We will ensure that all category A and B traitors, the
enablers of Islamization and the destroyers of our
cultures, nations and societies, will be executed.
In the sentence, a verb signalling intent such as “. . .will . . . ”
is followed by an expression of violent action (“executed”).
In WordNet, “executed” belongs to the same synonym set
as “put to death.”
Identification
The warning behavior called identification is defined as a
behavior indicating a desire to be a “pseudo-commando,”
have a warrior mentality, closely associate with weapons
or other military or law enforcement paraphernalia, iden-
tify with previous attackers or assassins, or identify one-
self as an agent to advance a particular cause [16]. This
rather broad definition shows the complexity of the phe-
nomenon. To make it more manageable, we follow [17]
and divide identification into two subcategories: identifi-
cation with radical action and identification with a role
model. Group identification is considered an essential part
of the radicalization of lone wolves as well as organized
terrorists.
Identification with a group or cause can be expressed
for instance by a usage of positive adjectives in connection
with mentioning of the group. Similarly, a usage of nega-
tive adjectives in connection with mentioning of a group
or person may indicate negative identification. To find
out which positive or negative sentiments that are present
in a text, or which kinds of emotions that are expressed,
sentiment and affect analysis techniques can be used. Ref-
erences to the group can be detected by investigating the
use of first person plural pronouns (“we” and “us”), while
much use of third person plural pronouns (e.g., “they” and
“them”) according to [28] can be used as an indicator of
extremism. In [28] the software LIWC is used to analyze
the content of al-Qaeda transcripts.
Identification with a warrior, the so-called warrior men-
tality, can be spotted through the use of a certain termi-
nology, while a sense of moral obligation can be expressed
through the usage of words related to duty, honor, justice,
etc.
Identification with another radical thinker can, aside
from frequent quoting and mentioning, be expressed by a
similarity in language. It is common that the same termi-
nology as the role model is used and there is a possibility
that even a similar sentence structure is used. In these
cases it is possible to use author recognition techniques to
identify similarities.
Example There are many examples of images and videos
posted on the Internet where lone wolf terrorists pose
with weapons long before the attack, such as the pictures
of Anders Behring Breivik wearing a compression sweater
and pointing an automatic weapon against the camera.
Other examples of identification can be found among
school shooters. One such example is Matthew Murray
who killed four people at a church and a missionary train-
ing school in Colorado. Murray compared himself to the
Columbine shooter Harris and Hui (who was responsible
for the shooting at Virginia Tech University) in an Internet
posting.
Fixation
The warning behavior fixation indicates a preoccupation
with a person or a cause, for instance increasing perse-
veration on the object of fixation, increasingly strident
opinion, or increasingly negative characterization of the
object of fixation [17].
Fixation can be observed as a tendency to repeatedly
comment on an issue or a person, which in written com-
munication would result in text wherein one person,
group or issue is mentioned by the subject with a sig-
nificantly higher frequency than it is mentioned by other
discussants. Also, frequent combinations of certain key
terms, for instance “jew” and “communism,” can reveal
a fixation with a certain idea. Fixation taking the form
of extensive fact-gathering can only be detected in com-
munication if a person chooses to share some of the
information.
In order to find this kind of fixation in text, the relative
frequency of key terms relating to named entities such as
persons, organizations, etc., can be counted. To find out
which words that relate to named entities, algorithms for
named entity recognition can be used. Implementations
of such algorithms are available in free natural language
processing toolkits such as NLTK and GATE.
Example An example text where fixation can be detected
can again be found in Anders Behring Breivik’s manifesto
“2083—A European Declaration of Independence”:
It is not only our right but also our duty to contribute to
preserve our identity, our culture and our national
sovereignty by preventing the ongoing Islamisation.
There is no Resistance Movement if individuals like us
refuse to contribute. . . Time is of the essence. We have
only a few decades to consolidate a sufficient level of
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resistance before our major cities are completely
demographically overwhelmed by Muslims. Ensuring
the successful distribution of this compendium to as
many Europeans as humanly possible will significantly
contribute to our success. It may be the only way to
avoid our present and future dhimmitude (enslavement)
under Islamicmajority rule in our own countries.
In the text, it can be noted that words related to Islam
(“Islamisation,” “Muslims,” and “Islamic”) are mentioned
with a high frequency.
Ranking and assessment of aliases
After collecting relevant data using the topic-filtered web
harvesting, the data is analyzed. The first part of the
analysis is to identify all aliases that are present in the
collected data. Thereafter the data is analyzed using tech-
niques described in the previous section while searching
for indicators for intent of committing an act of terror.
Online instantiation of model templates
Once an alias is identified in the collected data, the alias is
added to a list of aliases that need to be analyzed further.
Naturally, one indicator for intent is not enough to clas-
sify the alias as a potential lone wolf terrorist with good
reliability. However, having observed one indicator is a
good reason to start looking for other indicators. In order
to make a more detailed assessment of the alias, a threat
model template (Figure 1) is instantiated for the alias.
When a threat model for an alias has been instantiated,
all relevant information related to the alias is connected
to the indicators in the model. The threat model defines
how to combine indicators of intent as well as other rel-
evant indicators and can be used to do a summarized
assessment. Moreover, the threat model can be used to
determine which indicators we should collect more infor-
mation about in order to improve the assessment.
Combined indicator assessment
Since one indicator alone is insufficient for classifying an
alias as a potential lone wolf terrorist with certainty, we
need to combine the information of several indicators in
order to make an adequate assessment. There are several
potential ways to combine the indicators of intent that we
have described in this article. One way is to require that
we need positive evidence for all indicators in order to
be able to say that the alias has an evil intent with suffi-
cient credibility. Another way is to use a weighted average
model where some of the indicators are more important
than others. A third way is to demand that a certain num-
ber of indicators, e.g., three out of five, are sufficient in
order to say that an alias has intent. A fourth way is to use a
more advanced tailored statistical model such as Bayesian
belief networks which makes it possible to define complex
relationships between indicators. Since the statistical rela-
tionship between the indicators presented in this article
are unexplored, the use of such a model is not feasible at
the moment.
In addition to the current degree of belief that an alias
has an intent to commit a terror attack, the change over
time in the degree of belief may provide valuable informa-
tion. For example, an alias for which we have identified
two indicators and the degree of belief is increasing slowly
but surely, might be as interesting as an alias for which we
have identified three indicators and the degree of belief is
unchanged or decreasing.
Representing indicator states/values
The current state of an indicator can be represented in
numerous ways. One way is to represent the current state
by a binary value that expresses if we have evidence for
the indicator or not. Another way is to use discrete val-
ues such as “unknown,” “weak,” “moderate,” and “strong.” A
third way is to let a continuous value represent the prob-
ability (or belief mass, if we are using Dempster-Shafer
theory) that the indicator is true. Non-binary approaches
allow a more detailed way of describing the current state
of an indicator but requires a method (manual or auto-
matic) that specifies how to set the indicator state based
on available evidence. For example, three radical message
board entries are required to set the indicator value to
moderate.
Alias matching
One problem that arises when analyzing data from the
Internet is the fact that people may use several different
aliases. There are many potential reasons for an individ-
ual to use multiple aliases. It could be the case that the
first alias has been banned on the forum, or that the
author simply forgot the password to the original account.
It could also be the case that an alias has lost the others’
trust in the discussions, or that the author has developed
bad personal relationships with other individuals at the
forum. Another potential reason is that the author creates
multiple aliases in order to be able to write messages that
support his or her own arguments. No matter what the
reason is for having multiple aliases, the fact that many
people use several aliases makes an analysis more difficult
since it is harder to fuse weak signals generated by a single
user (individual) that is using multiple aliases.
Alias matching refers to techniques that can be used
to identify a user that has several different aliases. If a
user is active on a number of web sites, forums, or other
kinds of social media and uses several different aliases,
alias matching can be very difficult. In [29] and [9], tech-
niques for detecting multiple aliases in discussion boards
are described. Some of the components that can be used
to detect multiple aliases are:
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• similarities in alias name,
• stylometry,
• temporal information,
• similarities in networks (social networks or network
of threads).
If a user is using the same alias everywhere it is sim-
ple, and if there are only small variations in user names,
entity matching approaches such as the Jaro-Winkler dis-
tance metric [30] can be useful. However, if a user uses
aliases which are more or less arbitrarily selected, the
actual alias name as such cannot be used for the matching
process.
Stylometry or analysis of writing style makes use of
the assumption that every person has a more or less
individual “writeprint” (cf. fingerprint) that is based on
the way we write. A writeprint is created using differ-
ent characteristics that can be discovered in text. Such
characteristics could for example be choice of words, lan-
guage, syntactic features, syntactical patterns, choice of
subject, or different combinations of these characteristics
[31]. Internet-scale authorship identification based on sty-
lometry is described in [32]. Temporal information can
also be used to identify users with multiple aliases. Tem-
poral information could be information about what time
of the day messages are posted or frequency of messages
during longer time periods. Social network analysis (SNA)
[33,34] could also be used to help in the identification of
authors by computing structural similarities between dif-
ferent aliases. If two aliases post to the same forums, on
the same topics, and regularly comment on the same type
of posts, it is more likely that they are in fact the same. It
is also possible to use abstraction techniques such as sim-
ulation [35] to determine the likelihood with which two
aliases are the same. By combining various information
about the aliases and the messages written by aliases the
possibility to identify users withmultiple aliases increases.
In [9] we have shown that the combination of temporal
information and stylometric information can yield good
accuracy when detecting the use of multiple aliases in web
forums. The problem of alias matching is important for
the system proposed herein since we have to combine all
aliases that are used by the user of interest in order to
estimate the likelihood that an Internet user has intent to
become a lone wolf terrorist.
Identifying the physical person behind an alias is
another, although related, problem. If messages have been
posted on non-radical forums it might be possible for
police or intelligence services to get information about the
IP address that has been used when making the posting,
but this cannot be expected to be retrieved from extremist
forums. Moreover, the IP address may not necessarily be
of interest, since people can use dynamic IP numbers, use
computers at Internet cafes, connect through VPNs, etc.
The FOI Impactorium fusion platform
The FOI Impactorium fusion platform [6-8] is a proto-
type implementation that can be used to fuse information
from heterogenous sources. Impactorium can be used to
create top-down threat models as the one presented ear-
lier in the section entitled “Analysis model.” The threat
models can be constructed using a graphical user inter-
face or by using Impactorium’s RESTful webservice API.
The API makes it possible to create threat models or
instantiate model templates as part of an automated pro-
cess. The API can be used to instantiate a threat model
such as the one depicted in Figure 1, when an alias that
is active on a radical forum is detected. The API can
also be used to update the threat model or add evidence
to indicators. For example, an algorithm that performs
alias matching can use the API to merge two threat mod-
els. Impactorium also provides a subscription mechanism
which can be used to instantaneously receive a notifica-
tion when a model component, such as an indicator or
evidence, has been updated or added. This functionality
can be used to notify an analyst when the degree of belief
that an alias is a potential terrorist exceeds a threshold or
to notify other analysis tools that new models have been
created.
In Impactorium the values of the different indicators are
fused in order to come up with an answer to the original
problem, i.e., to which degree the collected evidence or
weak signals support the hypothesis that an individual is
(or will become) a lone wolf terrorist. A screen shot exem-
plifying how the values of a threat model are inferred in
the Impactorium tool is shown in Figure 3. In the figure,
the problem of deciding whether someone has the intent
to commit a terror act is broken down into five indica-
tors: active (on a radical web site), radical expression (in a
posting), leakage, identification, and fixation. In the figure,
evidence for the indicators “active on a radical web site”
and “radical expression” has been identified.
Various combination functions such as min, max, aver-
age, or weighted sum can be used to make inferences.
Except for combining the various digital traces that have
been collected, Impactorium also allows for fusion of
information coming from other sources, such as intel-
ligence reports or data from sensors. As an example,
if customs provide information that an individual has
bought large quantities of fertilizers, this information can
be inserted into the threat model calculations. In Figure 3,
the likelihood that an actor has intent to become a lone
wolf terrorist has increased since evidence for two (of the
five) indicators are found.
When monitoring extremist web sites, a threat model is
created for each alias and information about each alias is
gathered. Based on the results of the fusion, a list of aliases
worth monitoring more closely is created. An example of
such a list is shown in Figure 4. The list can be used by
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Figure 3 A threat model in the Impactorium tool, where a number of evidences have been fused.
an analyst to direct further investigations and resources to
the aliases on the list that have the highest likelihood of
becoming lone wolf terrorists.
The analysis models in Impactorium are meant to
be continuously updated and adapted to the current
situation. It is thus easy for the user to change them if, e.g.,
too many false positives are detected. Both the structure
of the models and the model parameters (e.g., how much
evidence that is needed before an individual is indicated
as a potential lone wolf ) can be changed. An indicator or
Figure 4 List of monitored aliases within the Impactorium tool.
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marker that has been determined to no longer be useful
can also be forgotten.
Since the content of web sites such as extremist forums
is not static, the overall process has to be repeated over
and over again. The first stages can however be donemore
seldom than the later phases, since forums andweb sites of
interest will pop up or become obsolete on a much slower
rate than the change in content within the web sites. It is
also important to note that duration of time is a significant
factor in this process. It is very likely that becoming a lone
wolf terrorist is not something that happens over night,
but is rather a process that can take several years.
Discussion
The search for digital traces on Internet that can be
fused in order to try to find potential lone wolf ter-
rorists must be considered a fine balance between peo-
ple’s security at the one hand, and people’s privacy on
the other hand. To automatically search through large
masses of text and use text mining techniques to try
to identify whether a piece of text should be treated as
radical or not can by some people be seen as a viola-
tion of privacy. The needs of the law enforcement and
intelligence communities and the privacy concerns must
be balanced. It should, however, be noted that analysts
are already checking extremist forums as of today. It is
always a human analyst that should check the reasons
for why a user has been classified as having a motive
or intent of being a potential lone wolf terrorist, and
whether actions should be taken to bind an alias to a phys-
ical person, and to collect more information using other
means. The analyst can also always decide whether an
alias should be removed from the list of “suspect” indi-
viduals. This highlights the need for a mixed-initiative
[36,37] system with a human-in-the-loop as a central
component.
Having such a human-in-the-loop makes it possible to
tolerate a higher number of false positives than would be
acceptable in a fully automated system. Since there is a
trade-off between false positives and false negatives, the
increase of false positives should decrease the number of
false negatives (i.e., classifying weak signals from poten-
tial terrorists as non-interesting). Hence, the suggested
method should be thought of as a help for the analyst to
filter out a smaller set of data to look at, rather than a
method to be fully automated.
In the description of the suggested methodology, we
have discussed how many indicators that are needed in
order to say something about the intent of an individual,
but there is also a question of how much material that
is needed in order to trigger a single indicator. This is
not a question with an easy answer since it most proba-
bly will vary for different indicators. Several radical posts
are clearly more interesting than a single radical post,
but several leakages are not necessarily worse than a sin-
gle one. It also depends on whether binary, discrete, or
continuous states are used, as mentioned earlier. The
thresholds to use for deciding when, or how strongly, an
indicator should be triggered remains as future work.
The analysis models and markers and indicators used
will need to be continuously updated and adapted, both
to keep track of changing behavior on the Internet and in
order to, for instance, remove markers and models that
have wrongly identified someone as a lone wolf terror-
ist. It is important that the tools used include ways of
doing this, similar to the model adaptation tools that are
implemented in the Impactorium tool.
While we have focused on analyzing text in this article, it
is worth noticing that a lot of material posted to web sites
and social media is not text. On extremist forums, it is not
unusual with video clips showing executions, bomb mak-
ing instructions, etc. There is much ongoing research on
image and video content analysis, as well as content-based
image retrieval (CBIR, see [38] for an overview) that can
be useful in the future, but as far as we know, no mature
techniques for identifying radical content in video with
good precision exists as of today. Another possibility is to
automatically extract speech from audio and video con-
tent and transcribe it into text. Such technology is, e.g.,
available in a beta version for certain English-language
videos on YouTube. The technology is still far from per-
fect, but it can be expected that it will work well in the
foreseeable future, and then also for other languages than
English.
The techniques we have proposed in this article are not
constrained to work for a single language. The classifiers
we are suggesting to use for classifying content as being
radical or not can work for any language. However, they
need to be learned with representative samples for each
language of interest. Moreover, many resources for text
mining (such as WordNet) are language dependent and
only works for English. One way to deal with content in
several languages is to develop separate lexicons for the
various languages of interest. Another way that demands
less resources is to preprocess the text using automatic
machine translation into a common language, and then
use the preprocessed text as input to the classifier. Such an
approach will probably give worse precision, but demand
less resources.
Lastly, it is important to point out that the concept
tools presented here are research suggestions and not an
operative system. The described concept tools are part
of an ongoing fusion framework development effort and
are partially implemented within that platform, where
they will be used for research experiments in the future.
A full implementation of support tools for web analysis
will need to include support for privacy and integrity
control as well as training support to avoid human biases
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when constructing the analysis models and identifying the
indicators.
Conclusions
One of the major problems when it comes to detecting
possible lone wolf terrorists is that there is no consistent
or typical profile of a lone wolf. Moreover, the lone wolves
are hard to capture using traditional intelligence methods
since there are no physical groups to infiltrate or wiretap.
However, there are many concrete actions and activities
(that are not necessarily illegal) taken by an individual
that can be treated as weak signals and that combined
may indicate an interest in terrorism acts. Recognizing
and analyzing digital traces from online activities of possi-
ble lone wolf terrorists is one key to the difficult problem
of detecting lone wolf terrorists before they strike. We
have presented a framework for working with such digital
traces through the use of techniques such as topic-filtered
web harvesting and content analysis using natural lan-
guage processing. Parts of the proposed system have been
implemented, while work remains to be done for other
parts.
It is important to highlight that the proposed system
is not intended to be fully automatic. The central com-
ponent of the system will be the human analyst, but this
analyst will be supported in the work of finding, analyzing,
and fusing digital traces of interest for finding poten-
tial lone wolf terrorists. In the future, we would like to
perform more detailed experiments with the prototype
system, to more properly evaluate the extent to which it is
useful for law enforcement officers.
Endnotes
1 The actual seeds to use are up to the analyst to define
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